Gerald Steinberg is a Professor of Political Science, Bar Ilan University, and founder of the Institute for NGO Research
(also known as NGO Monitor). His research focuses on international negotiations, Middle East diplomacy and strategy,
arms control, hard and soft power, international law, and the politics of non-governmental organizations.
Recent publications include: “NGOs, Human Rights, and Political Warfare in the Arab-Israel Conflict”;
"The Role of International Legal and Justice Discourse in Promoting the New Antisemitism";
and Menachem Begin and the Israel-Egypt Peace Process: Between Ideology and Realism (co-author with Ziv Rubinovitz).
He is also the recipient of the Menachem Begin and Bonei Zion prizes, and an Israel Science Foundation research grant.
Dr. Ziv Rubinovitz is an Israel Institute Teaching Fellow at Sonoma State Univerity and a Research Fellow at the Chaikin Chair
in Geostrategy at the University of Haifa. His research focuses on geopolitics, US foreign policy, Israeli foreign policy and
US-Israel relations. His publications include "Crude Peace: The Role of Oil Trade in the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Negotiations",
"The Rise of the Others: Can the US Stay on Top?" and "Blue & White Black September: Israel's Role in the Jordan 1970 Crisis"
for which he received the 2010 Kimmerling Prize of the Association for Israel Studies.
Source: Jimmy Carter Library, Vertical File: Camp David Accords through Carlucci, Frank C; box 8a, Camp David study papers
Source: Jimmy Carter Library; Donated Historical Material; Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection; Geographic File; Middle East [10/78-7/79] through Middle East – negotiations [7/78 – 9/78]; box 13, folder Middle East negotiations 7.29.78-9.6.78
Source: Israel State Archives A 4313/1
Source: Begin Center Archives, PM-0072/Israel State Archives MFA 6913/3
Source: Israel State Archives A 4313/4
Source: Israel State Archives: MFA/6913/2
Source: Israel State Archives A 4351/9
Source: Israel State Archives A 4314/5
Source:Israel State Archives MFA 6862/11
Source:Israel State Archives MFA 6862/11
Source:Israel State Archives A 4314/6
Source:Israel State Archives A 4174/10
Source:Israel State Archives A 4174/10
Source:Israel State Archives A 4174/11
Source:Israel State Archives A 4174/15
Table of contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction
- The Six-Day War and the Emergence of Begin’s Approach to Peace: 1967-70
- Return to Opposition: 1970-77
- Setting the Stage: May-November 1977
- From Jerusalem to Camp David: December 1977-August 1978
- Camp David – Between Psychology and Political Realism: September 1978
- The Domestic Political Struggle over the Camp David Accords: September 1978
- From a Framework to a Peace Treaty: October 1978-March 1979
- Implementation: A Glass Half Full
- Analysis and Implications
Bibliography
Index
Description:
Focusing on the character and personality of Menachem Begin, Gerald Steinberg and Ziv Rubinovitz offer a new look into the peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt in the 1970s. Begin's role as a peace negotiator has often been marginalized, but this sympathetic and critical portrait restores him to the center of the diplomatic process. Beginning with the events of 1967, Steinberg and Rubinovitz look at Begin's statements on foreign policy, including relations with Egypt, and his role as Prime Minister and chief signer of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. While Begin did not leave personal memoirs or diaries of the peace process, Steinberg and Rubinovitz have tapped into newly released Israeli archives and information housed at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and the Begin Heritage Center. The analysis illuminates the complexities that Menachem Begin faced in navigating between ideology and political realism in the negotiations towards a peace treaty that remains a unique diplomatic achievement.
Abstracts of chapters:
Chapter 1: Introduction
The book begins with the rationale for a new history of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations –examining the policies and perspectives of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, in light of the recently released Israeli and American documentation. Although Begin was a central actor, much of what has been published to date on his policies has been based on secondary sources, and is characterized by contradictions and inconsistencies.
The chapter also summarizes the claims and conclusions posed in the existing literature regarding the negotiation process, and introduces the relevant theories which are referenced later in the book.
We then move to the background, examining Begin’s Zionist Revisionist ideology, his connections with Jabotinsky and role in Betar, and his emphasis on the integrity of Eretz Israel, as expressed in his 1952 publication of Basic Outlines of Our Life-Worldview and Our National Outlook. In addition, we cover the key aspects of his leadership of the Irgun underground, and from 1948 to 1967, Begin’s statements and writings on foreign policy and territory as leader of Herut and the Knesset opposition.
Chapter 2: The Six Day War and the Emergence of Begin's Approach to Peace: 1967-1970
We begin the analysis with Begin’s actions and statements surrounding the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, during which Begin and his Gahal bloc joined the National Unity Government led by Mapai (Labor) and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. We analyze Begin’s role in cabinet wartime decision-making, particularly in ordering the IDF to capture the Old City of Jerusalem. and on his central impact in the post-war discussions on the future of the then newly-occupied territories. Begin, who had been labeled as radical and dangerous, was now seen as acting within the national consensus, particularly concerning the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. His views on the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza were subject to more disagreement, but he was not entirely isolated. With the Cabinet, he agreed on a “land for peace” framework in Golan and Sinai. But Begin, Allon and other ministers rejected this formula for the West Bank and Gaza. Begin also rejected Palestinian autonomy, arguing that this will lead to a Palestinian State, which he saw as unacceptable.
We then discuss Begin’s dissent when the Cabinet (now led by Golda Meir), under intense US pressure, voted to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242 and the Jarring initiative, leading to Begin’s resignation.
Chapter 3: Return to Opposition: 1970-1977
The years preceding Begin’s selection as Prime Minister were marked by the continued evolution of his views and policies related to foreign policy. Back in the Opposition, he continued to attack the government for agreeing to UNSCR 242. Being out of the coalition in 1973 spared Begin from any of the responsibility for the Yom Kippur War “catastrophe”, and he led the parliamentary criticism of the government. He attacked Prime Minister Meir and her successor, Yitzhak Rabin, for agreeing to partial withdrawals in Sinai–as part of the interim agreements that Secretary of State Kissinger orchestrated–arguing that territorial withdrawals should only be considered in the framework of peace treaties. The Labor government’s corruption, alongside the ongoing impact of the 1973 trauma and other factors, created the conditions for Likud’s election victory and for Begin to enter the position of prime minister.
Chapter 4: Setting the Stage: May-November 1977
Under Begin, the new government sought to prevent another war, and picking up on preliminary signals between Egypt’s President Anwar al-Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin before the elections, Begin sought to explore the options for peace. In his first meetings with US President Carter, Begin outlined his secret peace proposal, including potential territorial concessions and their rationale. He then met with Romanian President Ceausescu, who relayed Begin’s seriousness about peace to Sadat.
This set the stage for sending Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan to meet secretly in Morocco with Sadat’s envoy, Hassan Tuhami. Dayan implied (at least in Tuhami's understanding) that Begin was open to Sadat’s goal of regaining full sovereignty over Sinai. Begin and Sadat also realized a mutual interest in avoiding Carter’s pressure to reconvene the Geneva Conference, in cooperation with the Soviet Union. Following a number of hints from Sadat and positive responses from Begin, the Egyptian leader declared an interest in visiting in Jerusalem to talk directly with the Israelis. Begin immediately issued an invitation, and Sadat’s visit in November launched the direct negotiations that led, 18 months later, to a successful outcome.
Chapter 5: From Jerusalem to Camp David: December 1977-August 1978
Sadat’s visit and the intensive round of meetings and conferences that followed exposed core disagreements, and both leaders recognized the need to bring the US back into the process. As documented in this and subsequent chapters, the negotiations moved gradually from a focus on Israel-Egyptian talks to escalating confrontations between Begin and Carter, primarily over the Palestinian dimension. To preempt Carter’s emphasis on a “Palestinian homeland”, Begin presented his plan for individual Palestinian autonomy under Israeli control (a marked departure from his ideologically-based rejection of autonomy in 1967). We explain the sources of Begin’s peace proposal in the interest of reaching a peace treaty with Egypt.
Carter initially seemed to support Begin's plan, while Sadat firmly rejected it. Begin and Sadat agreed on a security committee meeting in Cairo and a political meeting in Jerusalem, which ended abruptly. The next six months saw very little contact or progress, although the security dialogue in Cairo continued. In July, the Leeds Castle UK meeting of the foreign ministers made little progress but led to Carter's proposal to hold a summit meeting with Begin and Sadat in order to break the deadlock. Both leaders accepted the invitation immediately.
Chapter 6: Camp David–Between Psychology and Political Realism: September 1978
In this chapter, we analyze Begin’s role as Israel’s chief negotiator during the summit with Carter and Sadat, based heavily on declassified Israeli documents that demonstrate how the Israeli delegation, and Begin specifically, conducted their dimension of the negotiations. After very limited preparation, Begin, Dayan, Weizman and the delegation arrive at Camp David. The bilateral Egypt-Israel track is discussed first. The major conflict revolved around Egypt's demand for the full removal of the entire Israeli presence in the Sinai, including the settlement communities, while Israel demanded that they remain, suggesting different security arrangements for them. Begin understood that without accepting Sadat's requirement, no treaty was possible, and made the necessary concession by agreeing to bring the question to the Knesset to decide.
The main focus of the summit shifted to the conflict between Begin and Carter, particularly on the future of the West Bank and the Israeli settlements there. Carter made numerous efforts and tried different tactics to force a change in the Israeli position, but Begin rejected them all. During their meeting on the last night, Carter claims to have received a pledge from Begin in the form of a five-year freeze on settlements, while Begin claimed that he promised only three months–the period set for final negotiations with Egypt. Israeli records suggest that Begin was correct, while the minimal American records from the summit are unclear. The summit ended with a joint framework agreement between Begin and Sadat, and without the West Bank terms demanded by Carter.
Chapter 7: The Domestic Political Struggle over the Camp David Accords: September 1978
The successful conclusion of the summit with the signing of the framework agreements for a peace treaty was a broad surprise, particularly in the Israeli domestic political framework. The Israeli Knesset split between supporters of Begin’s decision and opponents who focused on two issues: the dismantling of the Sinai settlements and the autonomy to the Palestinians. The support and opposition to Begin came from both ends of the spectrum, although more from the right–his own constituency. Begin and his senior ministers started campaigning for the agreements, acknowledging the costs but highlighting the benefits. This chapter follows the domestic struggle over the accords and the opposition that Begin faced in the Likud and its coalition partners, as well as in the Knesset and in the general public, until the vote which approved the agreement, including dismantling of the Sinai settlements. By the end, Begin depended on the opposition to support his compromises and policies, while the Likud was divided.
Chapter 8: From a Framework to a Peace Treaty: October 1978-March 1979
This chapter traces the domestic and foreign challenges that Begin, Dayan and Weizman faced from Camp David until the final agreement was reached. Domestically, Begin felt that he has gone as far as he could without triggering a major rupture and rebellion, and as a result, limited the mandate given to Dayan and Weizman in the ongoing negotiations. Israel and Egypt disagreed on critical articles of the draft peace treaty, particularly on whether the Egyptian commitment would have priority over defense treaties with Arab countries that could have allowed Cairo to join a war against Israel. Israel also demanded an agreement guaranteeing its oil supply following the return of Sinai, as the supply of Iranian oil was likely to end with the fall of the Shah. In addition, throughout this period, Carter and at times, Sadat, kept trying to force Israeli concessions on Palestinian autonomy. After the ministerial talks had reached an impasse and Carter had tried other forms of pressure, the U.S. president came to the region in March, shuttling between Cairo and Jerusalem. After several tense days—mostly in Israel—a formula was reached on the issue of treaty priority, the U.S. agreed to guarantee Israel’s oil supply for 15 years, and the attempt to link the peace treaty and autonomy was dropped. Begin then received the government’s approval of the treaty terms, noting that Israeli did not need to make further concessions which would have been bitterly opposed by his core supporters.
Chapter 9: Implementation: A Glass Half-full
This chapter follows the implementation of the treaty until the final Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982, including the evacuation and dismantling of the settlements and the beginning of the autonomy talks. Political changes included the resignations of Dayan and Weizman, both accusing Begin of causing the autonomy talks to deadlock, including the appointment of National Religious head Yosef Burg to lead these negotiations. We discuss the challenges that the peace treaty had faced including the strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981, the assassination of Sadat a few months later, the Lebanon War in June 1982, and Begin’s resignation in October 1983.
Chapter 10: Analysis and Implications
After 40 years, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty remains a singular achievement. There have been many attempts to copy the negotiation process and tactics, particularly the Camp David summit, and not only in the Middle Eastern context. All such attempts have ended in failure. In analyzing this case, we offer a broad analysis of Begin's approach to negotiations, stressing both his ideological red lines and, within these limits, his willingness to make difficult concessions and to fight for them in the domestic political dimension.
In this chapter we return to the theories and discuss their implementation in this case. We argue that the emphasis on psychology in international negotiations, as reflected in Carter's approach to Begin, was overstated, and note the limitations of theories focusing on activist third party intervention, and illustrate the relevance of two-level models focusing on the interaction between internal and external dimensions of negotiations.
| “Illuminating, well-researched, well-integrated, smooth, and authoritative.”
— Gil Troy, author of Moynihan’s Moment: America’s Fight against Zionism as Racism “Menachem Begin is presented as a forceful figure in events preceding, during, and after the negotiations in concluding a peace agreement that he felt was in Israel’s strategic interests both in order to significantly curtail military threats to Israel and to maintain and improve the important Israeli relationship with the United States.” — Yael S. Aronoff, author of The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers: When Hard-Liners Opt for Peace |